



IPCA

Independent Police
Conduct Authority

Mana Whanonga Pirihiimana Motuhake

Two men die in crash while fleeing Police in Wellington

1. In the early hours of 26 March 2023, a car heading into Wellington’s CBD was seen speeding through a red light by two officers in a patrol car (Officer A and B). The officers decided to stop the speeding car and followed with emergency lights and siren activated. The car crashed just over a kilometre later. The driver and a passenger died, and three other passengers suffered injuries.
2. The Authority acknowledges this matter involves the deaths of two young men and we extend our sympathy to the respective families.
3. Police notified the Authority of the incident as required by section 13 of the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988.¹ Accordingly, the Authority conducted an independent investigation into the incident.

The Authority’s Findings

Issue 1: Did the officers’ actions contribute to the car crash?

- The car crash was due to the driver, who was under the influence of alcohol and drugs, driving dangerously and losing control of his vehicle.
- We consider it was appropriate for the Police to try and stop the Mazda. However, by activating the emergency lights and siren in their attempt to do so, it is likely that Police inadvertently influenced the intoxicated driver to continue to drive dangerously.

Issue 2: Did Officers A and B breach Police policy and was their inexperience a factor?

- Officers A and B breached Police policy, but this was not a factor in the fatal crash.

¹ Section 13 says: “Where a Police employee acting in the execution of his or her duty causes, or appears to have caused, death or serious bodily harm to any person, the Commissioner shall as soon as practicable give to the Authority a written notice setting out particulars of the incident in which the death or serious bodily harm was caused.”

- Officer A and B had both recently graduated from the Police College and were partnered together with no immediate supervision. We do not consider this was a factor in the incident, although more experienced officers may have considered how a fleeing driver would react and may have used the Police radio more promptly.

Analysis of the Issues

4. In this section we describe what happened from the perspective of Police, and then include the information gathered during the Police investigation from the perspective of the occupants of the crashed vehicle. We then assess the issues that we have identified.

ISSUE 1: DID THE ACTIONS OF OFFICERS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAR CRASH?

What happened on the night of 25-26 March 2023?

From the perspectives of Officers A and B

5. During March 2023, Officers A and B were assigned to the Impairment Prevention Team (IPT). The IPT is responsible for checking motorists for alcohol or other drugs, and officers operate either as independent units or as part of a team at a checkpoint.
6. At 5pm on 25 March 2023, Officers A and B were partnered for a shift which was due to finish at 3am the following morning. Both officers were inexperienced, with neither having more than three months active service, which we explore later in this report.
7. Officers A and B, and other IPT staff, conducted impairment prevention duties in central Wellington. At just after 2am, the two officers were returning to their base at Porirua in their patrol car. Officer A was driving, Officer B was in the front passenger seat.
8. That night, the road conditions were good, with the weather being mild and dry. Due to the time of day, the road traffic was light, although there were other vehicles and pedestrians in the area.
9. The officers stopped at traffic lights on Bunny Street, about to turn left onto Waterloo Quay. As the traffic lights changed to green, a vehicle drove through a red light at high speed, heading south down Waterloo Quay.
10. The area they were driving in Wellington is known as ‘the quays’, which runs adjacent to the waterfront. Waterloo Quay changes into Customhouse Quay with a slight left turn on the traffic light intersection with Whitmore Street. Customhouse Quay is 250 metres long and changes into Jervois Quay with a slightly sharper left turn at the traffic light intersection with Brandon Street. Jervois Quay runs for 600 metres and changes into Cable Street with a still sharper left-hand corner.² It was at this corner where the Mazda left the road and crashed into a building.

² See Appendix 1 for a map of this area.

11. Although Officers A and B did not identify the make of the car as a Mazda until later, from hereon we will refer to the vehicle that drove through the red light as ‘the Mazda’.

12. Officer A later told us that he decided to stop the Mazda as he believed there was a risk to other road users and pedestrians because of how it was being driven. The driver had driven through a red light at speed and was weaving between other cars. He told us:

“I communicated with [Officer B] that we would signal the vehicle to stop... I was never planning on engaging in the pursuit if it’d failed. If it had failed to stop, I intended to notify police communications and pull to the side of the road.”

13. Officer B also told us he felt the risk to pedestrians and other road users was such that they needed to stop the Mazda. He said that he turned to Officer A and said something along the lines of “*We should grab that*”, which meant to try and stop the Mazda. Officer B activated the emergency lights and siren and Officer A drove after the Mazda on Waterloo Quay.

14. We consider the actions of Officer A and B, at that stage, were reasonable and appropriate. The pair had witnessed an act of dangerous driving which warranted their intervention.

From the perspective of the occupants of the Mazda.

15. The owner and driver of the Mazda was 19-year-old CJ-Lee Taingahue, who died in the crash. A rear seat passenger in the Mazda, [REDACTED], also died in the crash³. Three other people were in the Mazda, Mr Z (in the front seat), Mr Y and Mr X (both in the back seat). All three were injured but survived the crash.

16. It was established by the Police investigation that earlier in the evening the five men were at a party in Lower Hutt. Alcohol was plentiful and some people consumed recreational drugs, such as cannabis and synthetic cannabis.

17. After midnight, several people at the party decided to travel into central Wellington to continue socialising. Most made their way by a paid ride. Mr Taingahue decided, against the advice of the party host, to drive his Mazda. Four friends joined him in the car.

18. Through assessment of footage from roadside cameras, Police later established that during the trip into Wellington, Mr Taingahue drove at extremely high speed, at one point exceeding 180 kilometres per hour (kph) where the speed limit was 100kph.

19. Police interviews with the surviving passengers of the Mazda outline that they all told Mr Taingahue to slow down, but he continued to drive at a high speed. When Mr Taingahue sped through the red light at Waterloo Quay and Bunny Street, the passengers saw the Police car at the intersection, and then saw it drive after them with emergency lights activated. The passengers told Police that at this point, Mr Taingahue panicked and increased his speed.

³ Name redacted due to non-publication order, section 74, Coroners Act 2006, dated 7 June 2023.

What did the officers then do?

20. Officer A says he drove at speeds above the 50kph speed limit, which Police define as 'urgent duty driving' (as explained from paragraph 56), to catch up with the Mazda as he did not know if the driver had seen their Police car following with lights and sirens activated, signalling for him to stop.
21. Officer A says he caught a brief sight of the Mazda's rear lights as it rounded the first curve in the road from Waterloo into Customhouse Quay. On entering Customhouse Quay, Officer A could not see the Mazda, but he continued to drive above the speed limit. Officer A estimates that he drove at a maximum speed of 70-80kph, although he slowed to 20kph as he went through a red light with lights and siren activated.
22. On Jervois Quay, Officer A says that he believed he could see the Mazda's lights ahead, along with other cars on this road. Officer A told us he then decided to stop trying to catch up with the Mazda, as it was by now far ahead, and he did not think he would catch up. The emergency lights were left on until they passed two other vehicles. Then they were turned off. Officer A says he intended to pull over and stop at roadside car parks which he knew were on the left-hand side of Cable Street.
23. As the road curved into Cable Street, the officers found the Mazda had crashed. Officer A immediately instructed Officer B to report the crash on the radio to the Police Emergency Communications Centre (Comms).

What happened in the Mazda after they saw Police at the Bunny Street intersection?

24. Mr Taingahue sped up when he saw, and was told by his passengers about, the Police car, which had activated its emergency lights. The passengers said they told him to slow down, or even stop, but he would not.
25. When Police later took a statement from Mr X, he outlined that even though there was loud music playing in the Mazda, he shouted at Mr Taingahue to slow down and even suggested he stop and '*do a runner*'. However, Mr Taingahue did not slow down and, after swerving between two cars, he entered the left-hand corner onto Cable Street.
26. Mr Taingahue was driving well above the speed limit and failed to take the corner. The vehicle left the road and struck a building.
27. Post-mortem results revealed Mr Taingahue had a blood alcohol level of 174 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood. As he was aged 19 and on a Learner licence, he was subject to a zero-alcohol limit. The legal blood alcohol limit for a person above 20 years on a full licence is 50 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.
28. Tests also recorded Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active substance in cannabis, and synthetic cathinones (Dimethylpentylone and Pentylone) in his blood stream.

Were there any witnesses?

29. Apart from speaking to the passengers from the Mazda, Police also spoke to people who had been at the party with Mr Taingahue. Accounts were obtained that outlined how alcohol was consumed and there were drugs present. One person said he confronted Mr Taingahue saying he shouldn't drive as he was drunk. Mr Taingahue told him he would not drive.
30. At the time of the driving incident on the quays, an Acting Sergeant, Officer C, was attending a Police task just off Jervois Quay. Officer C later outlined that, as he walked back to his patrol car, he heard a speeding vehicle nearby.
31. Officer C then saw a dark Mazda speed past, heading south on Jervois Quay. He estimated the Mazda to have been travelling between 130 and 150kph. He did not have time to see the occupants or vehicle's registration number.
32. About 10 seconds later, he saw a patrol car with its emergency lights activated, heading in the same direction. He thought the patrol car was going slower than the Mazda.
33. Officer C got into his patrol car and, before he could transmit on his radio to Comms, he heard a report that there was a car crash on Cable Street.
34. Police also spoke to the occupant of a vehicle travelling along the quays, and pedestrians in the location at this time. In summary, these accounts were:
 - A woman, who was stationary in her car at traffic lights on Jervois Quay, saw red and blue flashing lights in her rear-view mirror and thought she was being stopped for a random breath alcohol test. Suddenly, a black-coloured Mazda sped past on her left through the red traffic light, at what she estimated was between 100 to 130kph. She said she later saw the Police car turn off its flashing lights and travel at normal speed. She continued driving and then saw the Mazda had crashed.
 - A male Police employee working night shift in Comms, was outside on a break near Jervois Quay when he heard a loud car engine and saw a black Mazda speeding in the south lane and weaving through traffic. He estimated it was going between 100 and 120kph. Very soon after, he heard a siren and saw a patrol car travelling in the same direction with emergency lights on. He did not think the siren was on the whole time but was being used intermittently. Shortly after, he heard a 'thump' and saw the emergency lights were stationary. He walked in that direction and saw the Mazda had crashed.
 - Two other pedestrians were nearby and heard skidding and then a loud smash. They went to the scene and one pedestrian said a Police car arrived about 30 seconds later, driving at normal speed. The other said that about 10 seconds after they got to the crashed car, a Police car arrived, with its red and blue lights off, but turned them on when it parked.

What is shown on traffic camera footage?

35. The distance from the intersection of Bunny Street and Waterloo Quay to the crash site at Cable Street is just over 1 kilometre.⁴ Footage from traffic cameras situated on the quays, indicate the Mazda was travelling at approximately 70kph and then increasing speed to over 100kph.
36. At the intersection of Whitmore Street and Waterloo Quay, footage shows the Mazda drove through a red light. Then, 8.8 seconds later the Police car, with emergency lights activated entered the intersection (by which time the traffic light was green).
37. At the next intersection of Hunter Street and Jervois Quay, the Police car was 14.5 seconds behind the Mazda, with its lights still activated.
38. A final traffic camera recorded the Mazda entering the curve of Jervois Quay and into Cable Street at high speed. About 16 seconds later, emergency red and blue flashing lights became visible, and two cars on Jervois Quay pulled over to the side of the road. The Police car then deactivated its emergency lights and drove at normal road speed toward the curve. The Police car arrived 30 seconds after the Mazda at the same point of the road.

What did the Police crash analysis reveal?

39. Police arranged examination of the Mazda which indicated it had been in good condition.
40. Crash analysis at the scene concluded that that there were no factors identified with the road, roadside or weather conditions that contributed to the crash.
41. Tyre friction marks that were located indicated the Mazda had lost traction on the corner into Cable Street and slid across three lanes, across the footpath and into a building.

FINDINGS ON ISSUE 1

The car crash was due to the driver, while under the influence of alcohol and drugs, driving dangerously and losing control of the vehicle.

We consider it was appropriate for the Police to try and stop the Mazda. However, by activating the patrol car's emergency lights and siren to pursue and stop the speeding Mazda, it was likely that Police unintentionally influenced the driver to continue to drive dangerously.

ISSUE 2: DID OFFICERS A AND B BREACH POLICE POLICY AND WAS THEIR INEXPERIENCE A FACTOR?

What Police policies are relevant?

42. In this section we detail the two Police policies that are most relevant to this incident and assess how they were applied by the officers.

⁴ Crash analysis by Police estimated the distance as 1159 metres.

Fleeing Driver Policy

43. The Police Fleeing Driver Policy is intended to guide decision-making when officers signal a driver to stop, and in the event of a fleeing driver, how to achieve the safest possible outcome.

44. According to that policy, a fleeing driver is:

“a driver who has been signalled to stop by a constable but fails to stop or remain stopped, or a driver who flees as a result of Police presence, whether signalled to stop or not.”⁵

45. Another important aspect of the policy is:

Before signalling a driver to stop, the initiating unit will decide whether to commence a pursuit if the driver fails to stop or remain stopped.

If the information available indicates a driver is likely to flee, the Emergency Communications Centre should be advised of:

- *the reason for wanting to stop the driver, and*
- *the intention to signal the driver to stop, and*
- *whether a pursuit is going to be initiated if the driver fails to stop*

46. Officer A was not trained or qualified to undertake a pursuit. He told us that, when he decided to follow the Mazda, he was not planning to engage in a pursuit if the driver failed to stop but intended to advise Comms and pull to the side of the road.

47. Regarding the decision of whether to proceed before signalling the driver to stop (by use of emergency lights and siren), Officer A said:

“Looking back, it’s hard to remember. I can’t remember what kind of discussions we had exactly that night. One of the big ones is that we both recognised that it had committed an offence, and we should stop it.”

48. Regarding this aspect, Officer B told us:

“So, [Officer A] and I had not had a discussion about that, but I always consider that before stopping a vehicle and so my decision-making in my mind was that if the vehicle deliberately flees, we would not be pursuing.”

49. Officer B also told us he did not initially make a radio transmission as:

“... the radio traffic had been quite busy [and] if I needed to make a transmission I would need to wait for a break in traffic”.

⁵ On 29 May 2023, Police introduced an updated ‘Fleeing Driver’ policy. The definition of a fleeing driver in the update policy is: “a driver who has been signalled to stop by an enforcement officer but fails to stop or fails to remain stopped.”

50. We reviewed the audio of the Police radio and concluded that there was time for Officer B to contact Comms. In our assessment, the officers were focused on attempting to catch up with the Mazda, operating lights and sirens, observing for other road users and pedestrians, and driving safely.
51. It appears that neither officer considered - or fully considered - the likely consequences of their actions before engaging their emergency lights and siren, to signal the driver of the Mazda to stop, as required by Policy. We are mindful that the officers had been positioned to turn left at Bunny Street, so it was appropriate to operate lights and siren as Officer A accelerated across the intersection after the Mazda.
52. Based on information we later received from passengers of the Mazda, Mr Taingahue was a fleeing driver as defined in the policy, as he was a “*driver who flees as a result of Police presence.*” We accept that neither Officer A nor B would have considered this as neither were satisfied that Mr Taingahue had been aware of the request to stop.
53. We also consider the inexperience of the officers, explored in detail below, was a factor in the lack of radio communication with Comms at the first opportunity.
54. We find that Officers A and B breached the Fleeing Driver Policy in that:
- Mr Taingahue was a fleeing driver, by policy definition, as he was fleeing because of Police presence,
 - Neither officer discussed their options before signalling the driver to stop (in acknowledging their lights and siren were activated to drive through the first intersection),
 - Officer B did not communicate to Comms at the first opportunity.
55. We do not believe this policy breach had any impact upon the outcome. We accept the officers intended to indicate to the driver that they wished him to stop, but when it became clear the Mazda was speeding ahead, they turned off their emergency lights and siren and intended to stop.

Police Policy on Urgent Duty Driving

56. The Police Urgent Duty Driving policy outlines how officers should drive when required to drive above the speed limit or above the speed of the natural flow of traffic and at intersections. The policy says that urgent duty driving can increase the exposure to risk of injury to Police employees and the public and must be able to be justified in response to a threat.
57. The policy requires emergency lights and sirens to be activated while Police are urgent duty driving. The only exception is when Police are making a ‘*tactical approach*’, so that the car being followed is not alerted to a Police presence.

58. Officer A said he travelled up to between 70 and 80kph as he drove after the Mazda, also telling us:

“At the first red light intersection I slowed down to 20 kilometres per hour, it’s the speed limit, the speed limit for police vehicles going through intersections at a red light or traffic’s going through them.”

59. Officer B told us that he turned the siren off, but then back on as they went through intersections, and then off again. He said he did this as he understood it was normal practice.
60. Witnesses reported the siren being intermittent and the patrol car slowing down for the intersections.
61. We consider Officer A complied with the Urgent Duty Driving Policy as he drove the patrol car in a sensible fashion. We consider Officer B did not follow policy when he failed to have the siren on while urgent duty driving. However, again, this policy breach did not have an impact upon the outcome.

Was the inexperience of the officers a factor?

62. Both Officers A and B had recently graduated from the College:
- Officer A graduated from the Police College two months prior to this incident.
 - Officer B had graduated from the Police College two weeks prior. We understand this incident occurred on his sixth shift as a constable.
63. According to Officer D, the Sergeant in charge of IPT (and the supervisor of Officers A and B), new officers can be assigned to IPT to gain experience in a more controlled area of policing, rather than being assigned directly to a front-line unit.
64. Officer D stated that, due to the shortage of senior officers, having inexperienced officers partnered together on occasion was unavoidable while performing their role on IPT.

To what extent did the officers’ inexperience have an impact?

65. We reiterate that we consider the car crash was due to a young man who, while under the influence of alcohol and drugs, drove dangerously and lost control of his vehicle. As Mr Taingahue drove through a red light at high speed, Officers A and B appropriately decided to stop the Mazda. In undertaking this, the officers breached Police Policy, likely due to inexperience. We find:
- The officers should have considered their approach before activating emergency lights and siren.
 - The officers’ use of emergency lights (and siren) likely influenced the intoxicated driver to continue to drive dangerously.

- Officer B should have kept the siren activated while Officer A drove under urgent duty conditions.
- The officers should have communicated with Police Comms earlier, ideally at the beginning of their endeavours to stop the Mazda.

Recruit driver training

66. At the time relevant to this report, Police recruits receive four and a half days of driver training, including practical and theoretical exercises. At graduation, officers are classified as “Silver Drivers”, which limits what they are authorised to do as a Police-car driver. Relevant to this incident, Silver Drivers are specifically not authorised to pursue fleeing drivers unless a more experienced officer with “Gold Driver” classification is providing direct supervision, or there are exceptional circumstances. Neither circumstance existed here.
67. We were advised by Police that, in recent years, the driver training has been reduced from two weeks to four and a half days. We were also informed the training does not cover the use of communications, and Urgent Duty Driving training is done on a racetrack, and not on public roads.
68. Training on the Fleeing Driver policy is delivered early in recruit training. The training is primarily delivered via a PowerPoint presentation, alongside classroom teaching and group discussion, however, there is no practical training. However – and using Officer A as an example – while his Fleeing Driver training occurred in November 2022, he told us he received no further training on fleeing drivers prior to this incident.
69. Copies of previous and current College driver training modules were provided to us. In the previous training module, use of communications was taught. In the current training module, there is no specific training to recruits on the use of communications while driving.
70. Officer D stated the training in the Police College on the use of the Police radio is negligible, and the intent appears to be for officers to learn how to use the radio once they have been assigned to Districts.
71. In the context where inexperienced officers may find themselves on duty with no direct supervision (as in this case), our view is that four and a half days training is inadequate.

FINDING ON ISSUE 2

Officers A and B committed breaches to Police policy, but these were not contributing factors in the subsequent fatal crash.

Officer A and B had both recently graduated from the Police College and were partnered together with no immediate supervision. We do not consider this was a factor in the incident, although more experienced officers may have considered how a fleeing driver might respond to their actions and may have used the Police radio more promptly.

Subsequent Police Actions

72. A review by Wellington Police has recommended that the Police College review the current driver training delivered to recruits to ensure officers graduate with a thorough understanding of the relevant policies and how to practically apply these in an operational setting.
73. We also recommended that Police review driver training provided to recruits to ascertain whether adequate time is assigned for teaching of:
- a. The Fleeing Driver policy;
 - b. Urgent duty driving; and
 - c. Use of Police radio communications.
74. As a result of the above recommendations, Police replied that:
- With the extension of the Recruit training programme from a 16-week to a 20-week course, the Recruit Driver Training programme has increased from 4.5 to 9 days.
 - The 9 days are split between driver training skills and road policing. During this, recruits are presented with a two-hour classroom lesson on fleeing drivers, which includes planning and strategy, followed by a one-hour scenario-based practical where they will “pursue” and conduct fleeing driver radio commentary.
75. Wellington Police have also recommended that their District provide further training on relevant policies to ensure each new officer’s transition from the Police College to District addresses the risk of fleeing driver incidents.



Judge Kenneth Johnston KC

Chair
Independent Police Conduct Authority

02 May 2024

IPCA: 23-17326

Appendix 1 – Route of Pursuit



Appendix – Laws and Policies

TRANSPORT ACT 1988

Section 52A – Contravention of section 114

- 76. A person commits an offence if they are the driver of a vehicle that fails to stop as soon as practicable when signalled or requested to stop under section 114.
- 77. The maximum penalty on conviction for an offence is a fine not exceeding \$10,000.

Section 114 – Power to require driver to stop and power of arrest

- 78. An enforcement officer in a vehicle following another vehicle may, by displaying flashing blue, or blue and red, lights or sounding a siren, require the driver of the other vehicle to stop.
- 79. An enforcement officer may arrest a person without warrant if the officer has good cause to suspect the person of having failed to comply with this section or a signal or request or requirement under this section.

POLICY

'Fleeing driver' policy

- 80. The 'Fleeing driver' policy states that the overarching principle for conduct and management of pursuits is: "Public and Police employee safety takes precedence over the immediate apprehension of a fleeing driver."
- 81. Under this policy, the pursuing officer[s] must carry out a TENR (Threat-Exposure-Necessity-Response) risk assessment when deciding to commence or continue a pursuit. The assessment required of officers includes consideration of the following:
 - 1) The threat, by any individual or action which is likely to cause harm to Police in the course of their duties.
 - 2) Exposure refers to the potential for harm (physical or otherwise) to people, places, or things. Exposure can be mitigated through assessment and planning.
 - 3) Necessity is the assessment to determine if there is a need for the operation or intervention to proceed now, later, or at all.
 - 4) Response must be a proportionate and timely execution of Police duties aided by the appropriate use of tactics and tactical options.
- 82. The TENR risk assessment must weigh up:

“... the ongoing exposure to harm that the fleeing driver incident poses, or is creating, with the current threat that the fleeing driver poses and the necessity to respond.”

83. During a pursuit, warning lights and siren must always be simultaneously activated. The Communications Centre must also be advised immediately if there is a fleeing driver and that a pursuit has been initiated.
84. Officers are required to carry out risk assessments before and during a pursuit to determine whether the need to immediately apprehend the fleeing offender is outweighed by the potential risks of a pursuit to the public, the occupants of the pursued vehicle, and/or the occupants of the Police car.
85. Fleeing driver incidents must be managed in the safest possible manner. A pursuit will only be commenced and/or continued when the seriousness of the offence and the necessity of immediate apprehension outweigh the risk of pursuing. The fact that a driver is fleeing does not in itself justify engaging in a pursuit.
86. Unless there is an immediate threat to public or staff safety, a pursuit must be abandoned if the identity of the offender becomes known, the fleeing driver does not pose an immediate threat to public or Police, and they can be apprehended later.

About the Authority

WHO IS THE INDEPENDENT POLICE CONDUCT AUTHORITY?

The Independent Police Conduct Authority is an independent body set up by Parliament to provide civilian oversight of Police conduct.

We are not part of the Police – the law requires us to be fully independent. The Authority is overseen by a Board, which is chaired by Judge Kenneth Johnston KC.

Being independent means that the Authority makes its own findings based on the facts and the law. We do not answer to the Police, the Government or anyone else over those findings. In this way, our independence is similar to that of a Court.

The Authority employs highly experienced staff who have worked in a range of law enforcement and related roles in New Zealand and overseas.

WHAT ARE THE AUTHORITY'S FUNCTIONS?

Under the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988, the Authority receives and may choose to investigate:

- complaints alleging misconduct or neglect of duty by Police;
- complaints about Police practices, policies and procedures affecting the complainant in a personal capacity;
- notifications of incidents in which Police actions have caused or appear to have caused death or serious bodily harm; and
- referrals by Police under a Memorandum of Understanding between the Authority and Police, which covers instances of potential reputational risk to Police (including serious offending by a Police officer or Police actions that may have an element of corruption).

The Authority's investigation may include visiting the scene of the incident, interviewing the officers involved and any witnesses, and reviewing evidence from the Police's investigation.

On completion of an investigation, the Authority must form an opinion about the Police conduct, policy, practice or procedure which was the subject of the complaint. The Authority may make recommendations to the Commissioner.

THIS REPORT

This report is the result of the work of a multi-disciplinary team. At significant points in the investigation itself and in the preparation of the report, the Authority conducted audits of both process and content.



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